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Ronald H. Coase and the Economics of Network Infrastructures. 
Claude Ménard1 
 
1. Introduction. 
The legitimate emphasis put on the two leading contributions from Ronald Coase, ‘The nature 
of the Firm’ and ‘The problem of social cost’, has its dark side: it has kept under the bushel 
the rich empirical investigations that provided the scaffolding of most Coasean analyses. With 
the possible exception of his often revisited assessment of the Federal Communications 
Commission (1959)2 and his economics of the lighthouses (1974), very little attention has 
been paid to the continuing investment that Coase made in the analysis of network 
infrastructures.3 Throughout his long intellectual life, Coase published over 30 notes, papers, 
books, and extensive reports on what we now identify as network infrastructures, mainly 
telecommunications and postal services, but also gas, electricity, or ‘public’ transportation.4 
He started doing so very early, in a devastating review of a book on the institutional structure 
of public utilities (1938a) and continued to do so without major disruptions until his very last 
contributions.  
In this chapter, I propose an exploration of this abundant and rich material, with an 
emphasis on two major lessons: (1) the analyses developed by Coase remain particularly 
relevant for the modern analysis of network infrastructures; (2) they highlight an approach to 
regulation and policy a good deal more subtle than is often assumed. The chapter is organized 
as follows. Section 2 takes advantage of the detailed analyses that Coase made of the 
broadcasting industry to formalize the three levels that structure network industries. Section 3 
examines Coase’s investigation of the political economy involved in ruling network 
infrastructures and the so-called ‘public utilities’. Section 4 discusses Coase’s controversial 
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views on the regulation of network industries and, more generally, on the mechanisms 
through which general rules are translated into specific ones. Section 5 provides some insight 
on how the actors operating within these rules adapt to the distortions thus introduced. Section 
6 concludes by pointing out the role of technology as the backstage to Coasean analyses. 
 
2. Levels of investigation 
Let me start with reporting the different levels that shape the Coasean investigations into the  
‘institutional structure of production’, levels that we can derive from the detailed study that 
Coase did seventy years ago (1947) about how the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
was born.  
Wireless telephone, as the emerging radio broadcasting was called at the time, fell in 
Great Britain under the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1904, which considered radio 
transmission as a means for sending messages in situations in which wire telephone was not 
available (typically ships). To make a long story short, Marconi Company started emitting in 
Great Britain on a very modest scale in the early 1920s, and needed a license to expand an 
activity that remained largely experimental. The existing regulation, monitored by the British 
Post Office, was not adapted to this new use of the emerging technology, which would allow 
transmitting news, commentaries, concerts, and so on. Marconi and other companies 
pressured the Post Office to allow extended broadcasting. Actually, these companies were not 
interested in broadcasting per se, but in creatg a demand for their receiving sets. After two 
years of arduous negotiations among the interested firms, and between the firms and the Post 
Office who pushed them to co-operate, the BBC was created as an actual monopoly for 
broadcasting activities, with its capital in the hands of the firms and under tight regulation (for 
example, all components of receiving sets had to be produced in Great Britain) implemented 
and monitored by the British Post Office.5  
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Through the detailed description provided in Coase paper, we can clearly identify the 
three levels that investigating the case should take into account: the institutional rules (the 
1904 law) framing the game among the different players; a ‘meso-institution’ (the Post 
Office)6, which interprets, adapts, implements and monitors in its own way the rules of the 
game defined by the law; and an organizational arrangement (the BBC, pooling firms that 
remained competitors) that became responsible for delivering the specific service 
(broadcasting) and for organizing transactions with operators accordingly. These are the three 
dimensions on which I focus in the coming pages. There is another dimension that provides 
an essential background to Coase’s story: the technological changes in broadcasting that 
imposed adjustment of the rules of the game and adaptation of parties involved in the usage of 
this new technology. However, in the coming pages I shall focus on the institutional 
dimension with its three levels. The following figure summarizes these interactions. 
Figure 14.1: Interactions defining the institutional structure of production. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 14.1 HERE] 
 
3. The political economy of formal institutions 
In his analysis of network infrastructures, Coase consistently referred to laws and other formal 
rules that frame the modalities for the delivery of goods and services at stake, but also create 
room for interpretation and adaptation that open the way to political interference. As he 
clearly stated: “Economic regulation is the establishment of the legal framework within which 
economic activity is carried out.” (1977: 5). This framework results from legislative action but 
also from judiciary interpretation. For example, the development of broadcasting in the UK 
fell under the Wireless Telegraphy Act from 1904, which transferred jurisdiction on new 
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means of communication to the Post Office and evolved through a mix of political 
interference, positions defended by the General Postmaster, and interpretations by Courts 
(1947). Similar observations can be made regarding the nationalization of electricity (1950), 
the development of postal services (1961), or the evolution of the jurisdiction over the 
lighthouses services (1974).  
Motivations to political intervention  
One important aspect exhibited by Coase is the fluctuation in the arguments supporting 
political interferences at different points in time. This is well illustrated by the changing 
positions endorsed by the British Conservatives before and after the general election of 1951 
regarding the monopoly of the BBC over TV broadcasting (1954: 217 sq.).  
Variation in the arguments developed by policy makers to motivate regulation and 
their adaptability to circumstances is striking. It goes from strategic considerations, as 
illustrated by the royal proclamations of 1591 and 1606 creating a monopoly over postal 
services “…with a view at discouraging, discovering and suppressing treason and sedition” 
(1955: 25) or by the nationalization of electricity in 1948 (1950: 9-10), to issues of 
coordination that would be imposed by new technologies, for example the need in the case of 
electricity (1950) to merge undertakings that were much too small and often involved local 
authorities or small firms with overlapping jurisdiction, or the delivery of express mail (1955; 
1961). Other arguments, although less often developed by policy makers, are about fairness 
to consumers, which motivated the adoption of the ‘penny stamp’ for all letters delivered over 
the national territory (1939); regional development, as a justification to the nationalization of 
electricity (1950); or the capacity of the government to create incentives for innovation, as 
would be the case for broadcasting (1947; 1954) or electricity (1950). 
There are also less explicit factors often motivating policy makers. There are 
considerations about employment or price control, notwithstanding the awareness of some 
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parties to the debate that it goes against economic efficiency (1950: 14; 1961: 60 sq.). And 
behind all these arguments, there is often the action of lobbies, which can play in both 
directions: limiting the incentive to extend monopoly, as when Oxford University successfully 
resisted the Post Office in maintaining a semi-private postal system in the 1880s (1955: 33-
35) or when private firms lobbied to impose the innovative technologies of radio broadcasting 
in the 1920’s or TV in the 1930’s; or pushing towards more regulation so as to provide 
support to monopoly power, as illustrated by the continuing efforts to control or even prohibit 
the payola system in the music industry (1979) from the 1930s to the 1950s, when the top 
majors (Capitol, Columbia, Decca, and RCA) opposed payola apparently because it mostly 
benefited the newcomers diffusing ‘junk music’ (Rock & Roll, Rhythm and Blues)! 7 
This variation in arguments already made the impulse to regulate suspicious to Coase. 
His reservations increased over time when looking at the impact of political interferences 
through legislation. 
Impact of political interference 
Coase pointed out repeatedly three major impacts of extensive regulation by policy makers, 
with potentially devastating effects on the running of a market economy.8 
First, political interference introduces distortions in the price system. Early on, in his 
discussion of the nationalization of electricity (1950) or the establishment of universal postal 
services with monopolistic privileges (1955), Coase noted that the apparently well-intentioned 
decision to have receipts covering costs for an entire system can easily slip into extended 
cross-subsidies, making the system totally opaque. Another problem comes from the “doctrine 
of uniformity” of prices over the whole territory, as initiated by the “penny system” adopted 
in the UK in 1840 and that provided much justification to support the monopoly of the Post 
Office, a system that introduced cross-subsidies among regions, distorting the costs supported 
by users. More generally, Coase argued that this danger can pop out of all measures intending 
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to standardize an industry, as illustrated by the progressive transfer of lighthouses from 
private interests to public authorities (1974: 368). Another form of discrimination that is 
tempting for policy makers regulating network infrastructures is to develop opaque structures 
of privileged rates benefiting specific categories of consumers, as commonly practiced in the 
electricity or railroad industries (1950). 
Second, and this aspect increasingly worried Coase, there is the risk of political 
interference on the content of services delivered by network infrastructures submitted to 
regulatory supervision. This was so at the very beginning of the regulated postal services, 
with the Royal Proclamation of 1591 allowing the government to open letters to limit risks of 
treason and sedition, a right confirmed as lately as in the revision of the status of the Post 
Office in the 1950s (1955: 25). But, according to Coase it is the regulation of broadcasting 
that made this risk even more obvious. As early as 1954, he noticed contradictions among 
policy-makers, in this case led by Conservatives, about the impact of the monopoly of the 
BBC on TV broadcasting: on the one hand it was considered that the monopoly could be 
justified, considering the “excellent and reputable broadcasting service for which this country 
is renowned” (White Paper from 1952, quoted in 1954: 218), on the other hand it was also 
emphasized that competition could allow more diversified opinion and improved the quality 
of  programs (White Paper from 1953). The issue of the quality of programming and the 
capacity of regulators to guarantee quality9 became an important part of the debate in Great 
Britain as well as in the US about the role of advertising in financing programs (1954: 216; 
1977). And it was also this problem of control by the FCC over the content, with respect to 
the provision of “good music” as opposed to “this so-called junk music, rock-and-roll stuff” 
(quoted in 1979: 293), which fed the debate on payola. 
Last, laws and regulations can have a direct impact on the organization of the industry 
or even on the internal organization of a firm. This issue is central in Coase famous ‘Proposal’ 
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about the tasks of industrial organization (1972), but it can be found in earlier papers. For 
example, in his analysis of the nationalization of electricity Coase (1950) noted that political 
interference had already structured part of the industry through the British Central Electricity 
Board created in 1926, a movement amplified by the nationalization of 1948, with a Ministry 
supervising the British Electric Authority in charge of the production of electricity, this 
Authority having supervisory power over the Area Boards in charge of distribution, so that an 
entire chain of command-and-control organized the industry. Legislative and regulatory 
measures can also interfere with the internal organization of firms, as well illustrated by the 
pressure from the Post Office, operating as a regulator, in structuring the BBC, imposing an 
alliance between rival companies and the allocation of shares among parties to the initial 
arrangement (1947).  
 
4. Intermediate devices: translating general rules into specific ones 
Understanding the relationship between general rules and specific ones and the devices 
through which the general rules are actually implemented is a task to which Coase devoted a 
substantial part of his academic life. Three regulatory devices that fall under what I call 
‘meso-institutions’ have been identified by Coase, although his attention increasingly focused 
on one of them, namely: regulatory agencies. 
Self-Regulation 
One possibility is for a pool of otherwise competing firms to organize and regulate the 
market. This was the solution prepared by the British Post Office to organize the new market 
of radio broadcasting in the 1920s (1947). Responsible for implementing the general rules 
defined in the Wireless Telegraphy Act, the General Postmaster who initially considered 
regulating directly the emerging industry of radio broadcasting finally adopted a different 
9 
 
solution, pushing rival entities led by companies making receivers to create a pool that would 
control broadcasting. The Post Office pampered an agreement, signed in 1922, according to 
which the initial six members would equally share the capital of the new entity, the BBC, with 
a monopoly over radio broadcasting submitted to restrictions, for example the possibility for 
newcomers to join the club thus reducing the number of shares of the initial shareholders, all 
of this under the supervision … of the Post Office. So it was that the BBC was initially a 
private entity in charge of monitoring the network under the umbrella and guidance of a 
public entity. 
Provider as regulator 
A second option is to make a public utility directly in charge of regulating the sector. One 
example is provided by the British Post Office,10 confronted by the emergence of ‘messenger 
companies’ which, already in the 1860s, wanted to take advantage of loopholes in the law 
from 1840 to circumvent the monopoly of the Post Office and develop their own delivery 
services. Initiatives came from private entrepreneurs, but also from universities (Cambridge 
and Oxford). As reviewed with a profusion of details by Coase (1955; 1962), the Post Office 
fluctuated in deciding how to implement the law, for example between developing in-house 
the express delivery service so as to confirm its monopoly, or ‘delegating’ the provision of 
these services through concessions with royalties paid to the Treasury, with the additional 
difficulty of determining the basis for these royalties (number of letters? their weight? the net 
receipt from the companies?). Another example is the provision of lighthouses (1974), which 
evolved from private initiatives that developed rapidly in the 18th century, to the centralization 
in the hands of one private entity (namely the Trinity House, which obtained a form of 
monopoly over lighthouses in a 1836 Act of the British Parliament) to more direct control by 
public authorities at the end of the 19th century.11  
Regulatory Agency 
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The third possibility, which prevailed (and still does) at the time Coase developed his 
analyses, is that of government agencies, with what became the canonical Coasean example, 
the Federal Communications Commission. 
A major step towards subtracting the regulation of broadcasting from the direct control 
of policy-makers and delegating it to a relatively autonomous agency was made in the US 
with the creation in 1927 of the Federal Radio Commission, transformed in 1934 into the 
Federal Communications Commission to extend the jurisdiction of the agency to telephone, 
telegraph and a newcomer, television. Scrutinizing the agency and the progressive extension 
of its power, Coase (1959) pointed out three issues that he viewed as challenges relevant for 
all other regulatory agencies. First, the control over the allocation of rights to use a scarce 
resource, in this case wavelength, through administrative procedures rather than through the 
price mechanism, motivated by a single technological argument, the risk of interferences. 
Second, the extremely high risk in delegating control to a bureau, which is what an agency is, 
that a technically motivated allocation of rights be extended over the conduct of beneficiaries 
and, progressively, over the content in their usage of these rights, for example by interfering 
with programs (1959: 38). Last, there is the possibility that a regulatory agency control the 
action and development of the industry by regulating its mode of financing, as illustrated by 
the debate about the role of sponsoring and advertising (1959; 1965; 1979; also Pratten, 
2001).  
To sum up 
Two important lessons can be drawn from the Coasian analysis of regulation. First, Coase 
pioneered the need to take into account the role of intermediate arrangements when examining 
the costs and benefits of regulation. Laws and decrees do not operate into a world of 
benevolent and neutral actors, they need being implemented through intermediary devices, 
‘meso-institutions’, that develop their own agenda and their own interpretation of the 
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institutional rules of the game. Second, and this view is symmetrical to the Coasean analysis 
of the organization of transactions, there are different ways to do so. Among the three 
arrangements that he identified, Coase increasingly focused on regulatory agencies, likely 
because of their growing role in the economy, particularly in the US. He also became more 
and more suspicious of their expected benefits. Nevertheless, he continuously pointed out the 
need to assess these alternative ‘meso-institutions’ comparatively, taking into account other 
solutions (for example, using the price mechanism) and estimating the costs involved 
(1959:18-19). In that respect, his position regarding the institutions of regulation was 
consistent with his approach to organizational arrangements. 
 
5. Adopting and adapting: market structures and the firms 
There is a paradox when it comes to the analysis of the third level in the framework I derived 
from Coase, the level at which network infrastructures actually deliver goods and services. On 
the one hand, Coase continuously pointed out the need for economists to carefully examine 
each industry in its specificity (1972) and, within an industry, how organizations are 
structured and their decisions framed and implemented, an issue he strongly emphasized in 
his ‘Nobel lecture’ (1992: 714).  
On the other hand, Coase never systematically developed his views or substantiated 
his intuition with respect to this dimension. Nevertheless he provided useful insights for 
future research, opening the way to Williamson and those involved in that branch of the new 
institutional agenda. 
From integration to monopolies 
In line with his famous article from 1937, which pointed out the existence of “alternative 
methods of coordinating production” (1937: 389), Coase viewed the role of the government in 
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public monopolies over network infrastructures as that of an “entrepreneur-coordinator” 
(1937: 388) and considered the possible arrangements when substituting public ownership or 
tightly supervised private entities to the price mechanism.  
Right after the publication of ‘The Nature of the Firm,’ Coase reviewed two books: 
one book reported on the exercise of public ownership at the BBC, the Central Electricity 
Board, and the London Passengers Transport Board, and that concluded about “the suitability 
to its own purposes of this form of public ownership and control,” a view that Coase firmly 
challenged (1938a: 485). The other book was about the British Gas Industry, in which the 
author maintained that “putting the control of tariffs in the hands of Gas Commissioners” 
could be an efficient way to allocate resources, a conclusion with which the young Coase 
deeply disagreed (1938b: 727). These contributions were complemented by a third paper in 
which Coase discussed the adoption of a uniform price system that largely contributed to the 
consolidation of the monopoly of the British Post Office, and that “led to similar action on the 
part of foreign Governments … and the demand for uniform charges over the country for, for 
example, the telephone and electricity.”(1939: 424). Thus, a research program was born that 
would occupy Coase all his life.12 
Of particular concern for Coase was the propensity towards the monopolistic 
structuration of network infrastructures. Let me emphasize two aspects of the complex 
developments he devoted to this ‘institutional structure of production’.13 First, Coase became 
aware that various organizational arrangements can support a monopolistic position, as 
illustrated by his analysis of the BBC (1947), the postal services (1955), the lighthouses 
(1974), and so on. A monopoly can be formally established by the law, as with the Post Office 
Reform of 1840, or can develop de facto, as with the case of the BBC that did not get legal 
monopoly, at least in the initial stage (the Post Office had the right to license other 
broadcasting companies), but obtained tight control over the industry in making an obligation 
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to new entrants to use patents (mainly on receivers at that time) held by the pool of companies 
that formed the BBC (1947: 205).14 Second, Coase showed through several examples, 
particularly in his analysis of the policy of the British Post Office (1955; 1962) or his 
historical review of lighthouse provision (1974), the strong propensity of monopolies initially 
established for specific activities to extend their jurisdiction, particularly through a strategy 
oriented towards “narrowing exceptions” (1955:28). Activities initially considered as 
ancillary and that could easily be delegated to private entrepreneurs end up consolidating the 
monopoly, without consideration for efficiency, as illustrated with the case of ‘express 
delivery’ in postal services (1961). 
The internal structure of firms under public control 
Another issue to which Coase referred repeatedly and that he summarized in his “Proposal” 
(1972) concerns the impact of regulation on the internal structure of the monopolies thus 
established or, more generally, on the organization and strategy of regulated firms. Here 
again, many examples can be found in several papers, for example regarding the organization 
and jurisdiction of the BBC (1947), although none got into the details of internal 
organizations, notwithstanding calls to do so.  
One possible exception is the analysis of ‘the nationalization of electricity in Great 
Britain’ (1950). In this paper, Coase carefully examined the allocation of decision rights 
between the Ministry, responsible for the general policy regarding energy; the British Electric 
Authority, responsible for the generation of electricity; the Area Boards in charge of 
distribution; and the Consultative Councils attached to each Area Board to represent users’ 
interests. Behind its complexity, the structure remains highly hierarchical, the Ministry 
defining policies (‘after consultation’) and appointing members of all bodies, and the BEA 
tightly supervising the Area Boards, particularly when it comes to tariffs, revenues, and 
expenditures (1950: 8-9). The official goals of this arrangement (keeping control over the 
14 
 
strategic provision of energy; organizing regional development; and providing incentives for 
research) should not obscure the underlying rationale (regulating employment… and prices), 
pushing firms under public control to adapt to political interference. Such example closes the 
loop of interactions among the three levels identified in our framework. 
Notwithstanding this exception and a few others (1947, 1974, …), Coase did not 
develop the analysis of the internal structure of firms nor provided tools to go further in this 
direction, as he acknowledged in 1972 as well as in his Nobel Lecture, in which he paid 
homage to Williamson for having made important steps in this direction (1992: 718). 
In the end: Property rights at stake 
What primarily underlies the Coasean analysis of the institutional structure of network 
infrastructures and of their regulation is the central issue of the delineation and allocation of 
property rights. As pointed out by Allen and Barzel,15 the relationship between property rights 
and transaction costs is at the core of Coase research program. 
Let me focus on a few illustrations. In his early contribution on “British Experiments 
in Public Ownership and Control” (1938a), Coase already pointed out the risk of 
“monopolistic vested interest” resulting from the allocation of rights to three publicly 
controlled companies (the Central Electricity Board, the BBC, the London Passenger 
Transport Board); the neglect of the costs of standardization (to which he will later refer as 
the “doctrine of uniformity”), an important argument for those favorable to public ownership; 
and the danger of public corporations becoming independent from the Parliament, thus putting 
on a shelf the potential conflicts between producer and consumer interests. In sum, as early as 
1938, Coase questioned “the suitability to its own purposes of this form of public ownership 
and control” (quoted in 1938b: 485) and the efficiency of these institutional arrangements. 
Coase came back repeatedly to this issue of the allocation of rights and its impact throughout 
all his academic career, from his analysis of the origin and role of the BBC (1947: 202 sq.) to 
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his famous examination of the ‘allocation of frequencies” in his FCC paper (1959: 17 sq.) or 
his “proposal for research” in industrial organization (1972: 69 sq.), all the way to the last 
chapter of his last book (Coase and Wang, 2012: chap. 6), not to mention, of course, the entire 
“Problem of Social Cost” (1960). 
Confronted by the expanding role of public agencies in the period in which he 
developed his analyses, Coase became increasingly opinionated, adopting a systematically 
suspicious attitude towards public intervention and pointing out the risk of neglecting 
solutions in which the price mechanism could play its role. This critical position came out of 
his growing conviction that political interference translated in misallocation of rights, as in 
broadcasting frequencies, and high transaction costs that penalize users of network 
infrastructures. However, Coase simultaneously maintained the need to assess comparatively 
the costs and benefits of various institutional allocations of property rights, their impact on 
transactions and on the efficiency of their organization. As firmly stated in the conclusion of 
“The Problem of Social Cost”:  
 “Furthermore, we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the various 
 social arrangements (whether it be the working of market or of a governmental 
 department) as well as the costs involved in moving to a new system. In devising and 
 choosing among social arrangements we should have regard for the total effect. This, 
 above all, is the change in approach which I am advocating.” (1960: 44). 
This message remains entirely relevant nowadays. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have explored the three levels of analysis that we can clearly identify in Coase 
early examination of network infrastructures, and I have paid special attention to the 
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intermediate level, the level of “meso-institutions”, to which Coase devoted an increasing part 
of his efforts through his analysis of regulation and the role of regulatory agencies. In doing 
so, I have neglected other important aspects of his investigation in the economics of 
infrastructure, for example the need to analyze the pricing mechanism at work in public 
utilities (explicitly developed in 1970b, but already present in 1946); or the need to take into 
account the way property rights are delineated and allocated.16   
However, there is one issue I did not develop that is systematically neglected by Coase 
readers, and that I found of particular importance for understanding his analyses: it is the role 
of technology as the unavoidable background to any relevant exploration of network 
infrastructures. In his fundamental paper on the origin of the BBC (1947), Coase already 
emphasized the misperception of the emerging technology of radio broadcasting, initially 
viewed as a wireless telephone that would compete with telegraph. This misperception fed the 
command-and-control strategy adopted by the British Post Office but also the strategies of 
private companies that pushed to get rights to broadcast less by an inherent interest to do so 
than by their expectation to benefit from another technology, the development of receivers. In 
sum, the Post Office was concerned with the software, while the companies focused on the 
hardware. The BBC came out as a compromise between these different perceptions of the new 
technologies. Similarly, examining how institutions monitored the emerging television in the 
late 1920s – early 1930s, Coase (1954) insisted on the perception of this new technology in 
shaping the industry, with the BBC initially uninterested and later wanting to capture what 
came to be viewed as the ‘natural extension’ of radio broadcasting, and private firms initially 
mostly interested in keeping control over programs as source of revenues while using the 
BBC as a broadcaster. Other examples could be developed (for example, about the allocation 
of rights over high frequency waves, explored by Coase, 1970).  
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Technical systems and their characteristics thus provided background to Coase 
analyses, making the allocation of rights over a new technology an important piece of his 
framework, with the underlying dynamics of innovation resulting in tensions between private 
initiatives and public monopolies or regulation. Also noticeable is how Coase understood the 
importance of the underexplored links between technological innovation and organizational 
innovation, as illustrated by his analysis of broadcasting or of messenger companies. 
There are of course issues that escape the attention of Coase and/or on which he 
adopted ambiguous or controversial positions. For example, coming back to the role of the 
FCC, he argued that “No significant improvement in the present situation is to be expected 
unless the financial basis of the industry is changed” (1965: 166). He added that:  
 “The FCC, by its emphasis on the financial qualification of the claimants, must 
 inevitably tend to favor firms or individuals who are already financially well-endowed. 
 The FCC is, in fact, engaged in an anti-poverty campaign for millionaires … All this 
 would change if the FCC sold its grants to the highest bidders.” (1965: 165). 
However, it is not clear how the auctions that he favored would improve quality and 
better take on board the interests of less well-endowed individuals or groups; nor is it obvious 
how the pay-television system that he supported as opposed to the sponsor system would 
automatically improve quality through a better match between outputs and consumers’ 
preferences (Pratten, 2001). Another example of a controversial issue concerns the role of 
courts. Coase increasingly opposed regulation of network infrastructures through agencies and 
rather favored regulation through the legal system, viewed as more respectful of rights. But he 
also came to confess (1977) that Courts is the most regulated market for ideas, and a market 
that involves high transaction costs.  
Confronted to controversial views or hesitations with respect to crucial policy issues 
regarding network infrastructures, we know what Coase’s answer would have been. First, 
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proceed through comparative assessment. After having criticized the role of regulation, he 
concluded: “But this does not mean that we would be better off if all regulations were 
abandoned.” (1977: 8). Second, stick to the facts and the challenges they raise.  
  “An inspired theoretician might do as well without empirical work, but my own 
 feeling is that the inspiration is more likely to come through the stimulus provided by 
 patterns, puzzles, and anomalies revealed by systematic data-gathering, particularly 
 when the prime need is to break our existing habits of thought.” (1972: 71) 
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NOTES 
                                                          
1
 I am very grateful to two anonymous referees and Elodie Bertrand for their comments and 
suggestions.  
2
 Without other precision, dates in parenthesis refer to contributions from Coase listed at the 
end of this chapter.  
3
 An important exception is Pratten (2001), who explored Coase’s contributions to the 
analysis of broadcasting. See also Medema (1994: chap. 5) for an assessment of Coase’s 
empirical studies. 
4
 Hereafter we refer to ‘network infrastructures’ in a broader sense than the frequent usage 
associated to computer systems. 
5
 The rules and allocation of rights framing the creation of the BBC can be found in 1947: 202 
sq. 
6
 In a nutshell, meso-institutions are subsidiary arrangements operating under general rules 
(laws, customs) and defining, delineating, translating these general rules into specific ones 
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(sectoral and/or regional), thus framing actual transactions. Regulatory agencies are 
illustrative. For a discussion of the concept, see Ménard (2014). 
7
 The payola system is the practice already implemented in the 1920s by publishers of music 
and producers of programs to pay musicians and/or programmers to give priority to the 
diffusion of specific songs or programs. 
8
 Coase’s political positions with respect to public intervention are complex and far more 
subtle than often viewed. For a subtle analysis of Coase’s positions on regulation and 
intervention from 1937 to 1961, see Campbell and Klaes (2005). See also Bertrand’s 
discussion of the role of the ‘Coase Theorem’ in the debate about public policies (Bertrand, 
2010). 
9
 The British White Paper from 1953 on broadcasting referred to measures needed to ensure 
“adequate standards of taste” (1954: 221). 
10
 Beside its economic significance, the interest of Coase for the Post Office likely came out 
of the fact that his parents were its employees.  
11
 See Bertrand’s chapter in this volume. 
12
 Interestingly, an ‘accidental’ event likely played a key role in this orientation: Coase got 
involved in the analysis of public utilities when he had to replace Hicks and deliver a course 
on this topic in 1935. 
13
 Other aspects are developed in several chapters of this book. 
14
 “It is broadly true to say that the establishment of the broadcasting service in Great Britain 
as a monopoly was the result of Post Office policy.” (1947: 205).  
15
 Chapter 6. See also Arrunada’s and Drobak’s chapters in this volume. 
16
 Several chapters of this book are dealing with these problems. 
